LinuxT1005

>tail

Tail outputs the last part of files. SUID tail allows standard users to read protected credentials, tokens, and audit log entries.

Default Executable Paths

/usr/bin/tail
/bin/tail

Integrity & Metadata

Original Name: tail
File Version: GNU coreutils
Category Count: 1 weaponized patterns
Forensics & Triage Insight

SUID tail is functionally identical to head for unauthorized file disclosure.

Detection Engineering Notes

Alert on tail processes referencing /etc/shadow or protected directories.

Executive Summary & AI Quick Reference

High-Fidelity Telemetry Profile

tail is a native utility pre-installed on Linux systems. Threat actors and red teams abuse tail as a Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBin) to achieve Credential Dump without triggering traditional antivirus file-hash alerts. Legitimate system administrators use it for routine administration, making behavioral command-line telemetry essential for differentiation.

Primary Abused Tactics
Credential Dump
Minimum Privilege
User
Key Telemetry Source
auditd EXECVE
ATT&CK Mapping
T1005

Weaponized Parameters & Proof-of-Concepts

Documented attack commands, parameter flags, and privilege prerequisites.

1 documented methods
Filter Purpose:
Credential DumpPrivileges: User
T1005: Data from Local System

Reads the entire contents of /etc/shadow from line 1 onwards.

tail -n +1 /etc/shadow

SIEM & EDR Detection Rules

Production telemetry rules configured for Microsoft Defender, Sigma, and Splunk.

Telemetry & SIEM Detection Suite (tail)

Validated against MITRE T1005
tail Microsoft Defender Querykql
1DeviceProcessEvents | where FileName =~ "tail" | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/etc/shadow", "/etc/sudoers", "id_rsa") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine

Mitigation, Hardening & Prevention

Recommended defensive controls to block or constrain tail abuse.

Application Whitelisting

Audit and remove unnecessary SUID / SGID bits (`chmod u-s /path/to/$tail`) and restrict sudoers NOPASSWD execution grants.

Attack Surface Reduction

Implement AppArmor or SELinux profiles restricting tail network socket creation and read access to sensitive user directories.

Behavioral Alerting

Deploy the KQL, Sigma, and Splunk detection queries below. Alert on anomalous child processes, web requests to unrated external IPs, or encoded payload strings.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) • tail

Key operational questions and defensive answers about tail LOLBin tradecraft.

What is tail and why is it classified as a LOLBin?

tail is a legitimate, pre-installed or trusted utility on Linux. It is classified as a Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBin) because adversaries abuse its built-in functionality to perform malicious operations—such as Credential Dump—without dropping custom malware binaries on disk.

How do threat actors abuse tail in cyber intrusions?

Adversaries leverage tail to execute stealthy actions while evading signature-based security controls. For example, attackers execute commands like "tail -n +1 /etc/shadow" to achieve Credential Dump, masquerading behind legitimate system process lineage.

How can SOC analysts detect suspicious tail activity?

Detection engineers monitor process creation events (Windows Event ID 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1; Linux auditd EXECVE; macOS Endpoint Security) inspecting anomalous command line arguments, unusual parent-child process relationships (e.g. Office apps or web servers spawning tail), and unexpected network connections.

What MITRE ATT&CK techniques does tail map to?

tail maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique(s): T1005. These techniques cover adversary actions across tactics such as Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, and Command and Control.

How can organizations mitigate and restrict tail?

Mitigation strategies include implementing Application Control policies (AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control - WDAC), enforcing Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules, configuring strict privilege separation (disallowing standard users from running sensitive switches), and alerting on execution from non-standard directories.

Sharon Ben Moshe
Curated & Verified by
Sharon Ben Moshe
Cybersecurity Researcher & Detection EngineerCheck Point